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Abstract. Emotions are intimately tied to motivation and the adaptation of behavior, and many animal 
species show evidence of emotions in their behavior. Therefore, emotions must be related to powerful 
mechanisms that aid survival, and, emotions must be evolutionary continuous phenomena. How and 
why did emotions evolve in nature, how do events get emotionally appraised, how do emotions relate 
to cognitive complexity, and, how do they impact behavior and learning? In this article I propose that all 
emotions are manifestations of reward processing, in particular Temporal Difference (TD) error 
assessment. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a powerful computational model for the learning of goal 
oriented tasks by exploration and feedback. Evidence indicates that RL-like processes exist in many 
animal species. Key in the processing of feedback in RL is the notion of TD error, the assessment of how 
much better or worse a situation just became, compared to what was previously expected (or, the 
estimated gain or loss of utility – or well-being – resulting from new evidence). I propose a TDRL Theory 
of Emotion and discuss its ramifications for our understanding of emotions in humans, animals and 
machines, and present psychological, neurobiological and computational evidence in its support.  
Introduction 
Emotions are essential in development. First, in infant-parent learning settings a child’s expression of 
emotion is critical for an observer’s understanding of the state of the child in the context of the learning 
process (Buss & Kiel, 2004). Second, emotional expressions of parents are critical feedback signals to 
children providing children with an evaluative reference of what just happened (Chong, Werker, Russell, 
& Carroll, 2003; Klinnert, 1984). In general, emotions plays a key role in shaping human behaviour. On 
an interpersonal level, emotions have a communicative function: the expression of an emotion can be 
used by others as a social feedback signal as well as a means to empathize with the expresser (Fischer & 
Manstead, 2008). On an intrapersonal level emotions have a reflective function (Oatley, 2010) and 
motivational function (Frijda, 2004): emotions shape behavior by providing feedback on past, current 
and future situations (Baumeister, Vohs, & Nathan DeWall, 2007) and emotions influence action 
tendencies. Finally, emotions result from event-related appraisal of personal relevance (Moors, 
Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013). In this article I define emotions as valenced experiences in reaction to 
(mental) events providing feedback to modify future action tendencies, grounded in bodily and 
homeostatic sensations and evolutionary developed serviceable habits. In Section 2 I will present an 
elaborate argument towards this definition. 
Human emotions are complex phenomena. Consider the emotion of guilt. It requires many information 
processing abilities to be fully developed including the ability to imagine yourself in someone else’s 
shoes, the ability to recognize that there is something like “others” in the first place, needing the ability 
to recognize the self. Further, you need to realize that you are responsible for, or at the very least 
causally connected to, the harm of the other. Finally you need to assess harm, presumably grounded in 
your own body.  
Human adults are fully developed beings with a wide pallet of emotions. This includes the classical basic 
emotions that are reliably expressed on faces such as frustration, sadness, joy and fear, but also includes 
emotions that are typically considered social, such as guilt, shame, reproach, envy, and schadenfreude 
(gloating). However, one can easily expand this list with feelings of which it is not clear if they should be 
considered emotions, such as rebellion (liking the fact that you don’t obey), awe (amazement about the 
unreal beauty or specialness of something or someone), and anxiety (the constant feeling of danger 
resulting in alertness and associated stress). These are definitely clearly identifiable feelings but are they 
emotions? Feelings typically refer to the conscious representation of the emotional state, e.g. as 
proposed by Damasio (Damasio, 1994) and LeDoux (LeDoux, 1996). However, this is not the distinction I 
use here. I use the term feeling to refer to any thought or stream of thoughts with associated positive or 
negative affective content. Some feelings are clearly distinguishable from emotions, such as feeling sick. 
Other feelings are clearly emotional, such as feeling joy. Human adult mental life is full of feelings, but is 
it full of emotions? 
Young children are simpler beings. Babies do not seem to differentiate between different positive 
emotions (undifferentiated pleasure) and between different negative emotions at all (undifferentiated 
distress) (Sroufe, 1997). Infants frequently experience frustration, sadness, joy, and fear, but seldom 
experience guilt and shame. Even when children are capable of experiencing guilt and shame, such 
emotions are still rare compared to the more “basic” emotions. On top of that, infants and children 
express and experience emotions more frequently and more intensely than adults. Emotions are 
expressed all the time during play and interaction with others, children cry, laugh and get angry more 
often and more intensely. Is that the result of prefrontal cortical inhibition or is that the result of 
children not having lived as long as adults and therefore their life is more emotionally salient because 
they spent less time forming habits? 
Many higher animals show evidence of emotions in their behavior. Of course we think of chimps, 
bonobos and dolphins. However, rats, mice, dogs, cats, bears and many other mammals and birds show 
clear signs of rich emotional life (Bekoff, 2008). And why would they not? They are living, surviving 
animals. More importantly, all mammals and the majority of birds are social by nature: they raise kids.  
Many lower animals show emotional behavior (J. Panksepp, 1982). Reptiles show signs of rage, sexual 
drive, fear, and relaxation. What kind of emotions are these? Perhaps proto-emotions, or biological 
drives? What about fish? They startle, forage and mate. Are those proto-emotion, drives, behaviors? 
What is the distinction between these? 
Unless we have a precise definition of emotion, one that is more precise, more mechanism-oriented and 
better testable than the definition I gave in the introductory paragraph, there is no way to answer these 
questions. There is unclarity about what emotions are both at the “higher human adult end” of the 
emotional spectrum as well as on the “lower reptilian end”.  
In this article I propose a simple hypothesis of what emotion is at its core. I propose, building on initial 
ideas by Brown and Wagner  (Brown & Wagner, 1964) and Redish (Redish, 2004; Redish, Jensen, 
Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007), and extending ideas of Baumeister (Baumeister et al., 2007) and Rolls 
(Rolls, 2000), and work on intrinsic motivation (Singh, Lewis, Barto, & Sorg, 2010) that all emotions are 
manifestations of reward processing in Reinforcement Learning, in particular that all emotions are 
manifestations of neural temporal difference assessment. I show that the emotional episode shares its 
essential elements – event triggered, feedback providing, action tendency related, valenced experience, 
and bodily - with the assessment of temporal difference errors. I refer to this as the Temporal Difference 
Reinforcement Learning (TDRL) Theory of Emotion. This theory has limits, as the final discussion will 
highlight. It does however provide a strict base definition of emotion for further scrutiny and it provides 
clear boundaries for what an emotion is and is not.   
In the rest of this article I will explain this hypothesis, show experimental, theoretical, and in computo 
support for it. Finally I examine the boundaries of this hypothesis. However, I first give an intuitive 
example of how the TDRL view explains fear as a manifestation of temporal difference processing. 
TDRL Emotion Theory in a nutshell  
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a powerful computational model for the learning of goal oriented tasks 
by exploration and feedback (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Evidence indicates that RL-like processes exist in 
many animal species (Suri, 2002). Key in the processing of feedback in RL is the notion of TD error, the 
assessment of how much better or worse a situation just became, compared to what was previously 
expected. 
In the TDRL Theory of emotion, distress (or joy when positive) is the manifestation of the assessment 
that your situation just got worse (or better). Worse means a decrease in value, which is a decrease in a 
common motivational currency as explained in later sections. Therefore, distress is the manifestation of 
negative adjustment, which is in RL terms equivalent to a negative temporal difference error.  
Fear (or hope when positive) in the TDRL Theory of emotion is the anticipation of distress (or joy when 
positive). Fear is thus the manifestation of anticipation of worsening of your situation. By anticipation I 
mean the imagining of a possible future state. Fear is thus the anticipated experienced distress where 
one to actually “move” towards and arrive in that state1. As distress is a relative signal, fear is also a 
relative signal. Let’s assume you imagine a trace of interactions ending in some state, s. If the value of 
that imagined state, s, has already been completely incorporated in the trace towards state s (let’s say a 
habit has formed), then all adjustments have been made already. In other words, you will not feel fear in 
that case. If, however, you experience negative adjustments during the imagination of the trace towards 
state s, then fear will be felt. Fear is thus a special case of distress, namely, fear is the manifestation of 
anticipation of negative adjustment. This assumes you can look ahead, i.e., you have a model of the 
world allowing you to anticipate negative adjustment (fear) in addition to calculate actual negative 
adjustment (distress). Fear therefore is very close to distress. This mechanism of anticipation is also the 
basic driver for subsequent regret and disappointment, in line with Reisenzein (Reisenzein, 2009b) and 
Mellers (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997), to which I will come later. 
Let’s take the example of my son playing and climbing rocks (Figure 1, left). My son plays and has fun 
and does not feel fear. Now consider the second setting (Figure 1, right): my son looking into a deep 
ravine, with my wife holding my son. My wife feels fear. However, the first setting is objectively more 
dangerous than the second. How come my son does not feel fear in either of these settings, while my 
wife feels strong fear even in the second setting? This example illustrates two important things: fear is 
relative and fear depends on anticipation, i.e., a model that allows lookahead. My son, being a child 
                                                          
1 Note that by “move” and “arrive” I do not literally mean movement but more so get closer in the abstract sense 
of the word, i.e., it is sufficient to imagine that there is a tendency towards ending up in that future state, 
potentially but not necessarily due to your own behavior. 
aged 6 at that time, does not anticipate distress due to slipping and falling. He lives in the now. He does 
not experience any (anticipated) negative adjustment. My wife, being an adult,  does anticipate negative 
adjustment, because (a) she can imagine that children do random things and (b) she experiences 
imagined distress due to her son falling off a ravine because this needs significant negative adjustment 
to her situation. This generates fear. 
The TDRL Theory of Emotion interprets this scenario as follows. My wife simulates state transitions that 
involve major negative adjustments (the death of our child by falling into the ravine2). These thoughts 
generate negative adjustments, of which my wife knows they are not actually happening, but still they 
are felt as real adjustments. These felt adjustments are actual temporal difference errors. This is fear: 
internally simulated negative temporal difference errors. If the event would happen as such, it would 
cause distress, i.e. actual negative temporal difference (TD) errors without the luxury of simulating an 
alternative future. The feeling of fear thus needs (a) the ability to feel distress, which I propose is a 
negative TD error, (b) the ability to anticipate3, and (c) the triggering of distress (TD errors) while 
anticipating. This also explains why fear “appears to be” such a powerful motivator. I write “appears” 
because in the TDRL Theory of Emotion fear is the manifestation of anticipated negative adjustment. As 
this anticipation of negative adjustment must be assessed using similar neural mechanisms as actual 
negative adjustment, it enables the individual to change future action motivation and subsequently 
chose behavior that reflects this adjustment. It is not the fear that drives the behavior, fear is the 
manifestation of anticipated negative adjustment and this adjustment leads to a different behavioral 
outcome in the now. My wife anticipates negative adjustment and feels fear, then holds our son firmly. 
This interpretation of fear and distress helps us understand many fear-related phenomena. Children are 
fearless and worry-free compared to adults because they have less elaborate anticipation capabilities. 
They have less habits, less cognitive control, working memory capacity, and top-down attention typically 
attributed to their underdeveloped inhibitory pre-frontal cortex capacity. Babies show signs of distress 
but not fear, as they have not yet developed any form of anticipation of interactions with the world. 
Rumination (e.g. in depression) causes actual distress because continuous activation of negative TD 
error calculations is as if these negative adjustments are happening. Positive rumination is an effective 
treatment for depression, for exactly the same reason. Depression relates to inactivity, if all options 
seem to involve negative adjustment, then why do anything in the first place? These and other 
phenomena will be dealt with in more detail later in this article. 
      
Figure 1. Fear as anticipation of negative adjustment 
                                                          
2 My children are doing fine by the way. 
3 which is model-based lookup in Reinforcement Learning terms. In this case, the individual learns a model of the 
action-environment statistics P( s’| s,a ), i.e., how do states change as a result of actions in particular states. 
Emotion 
What I consider to be emotions 
To systematically relate emotions to TD error processing, I have to precisely define what I consider 
emotions and what not. I propose 5 essential elements of emotion. First, I consider emotions to be 
reactions to external or internal events. An event is a measurable change in the state of the organism. It 
does not matter if this change is represented symbolically or not. What matters is that the organism is 
able to deduce that the situation changed with respect to just before. An event is thus a state change. 
Whether this is an imagined state change (a thought) or an actual state change does not matter either. 
This is in line with embodied cognition ideas of Cotterill (Cotterill, 2001), Heslow (Hesslow, 2002)  and 
Ziemke (Ziemke, Jirenhed, & Hesslow, 2005) proposing that a thought is grounded in simulation of 
actual behavior. Thoughts are internal simulations of behavior. For example, you just before imagining 
winning the lottery are different from you just after imagining winning the lottery. It does not matter 
that this though is not true, it is a state change anyway. This event-relatedness aspect of emotions also 
excludes longer-term affective states such as depression and mood (Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005) from 
emotions. It generalizes the often-seen object/person-relatedness as a common aspect of emotion in 
most cognitive emotion theories (Moors et al., 2013; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988): an emotion is 
related to a state change. 
Second, emotions are valenced experiences (Moors et al., 2013; Ortony et al., 1988). Valenced means 
that there is an assessment of positiveness versus negativeness based on personal relevance. As 
emotions are reactions to events, this means that emotions always involve an assessment of 
positiveness versus negativeness of a state change. For example,  if you learn that your flight home is 
canceled due to severe weather you will assess this as negative, because it impairs achieving your house 
which is a desired state. Feelings that relate to the general state of information processing are not 
considered emotions. For example, surprise, confusion and flow are usually considered affective feelings 
and some even refer to these feelings as emotions. However, such feelings are more related to the 
general state of information processing, rather than event-related assessments of positiveness and 
negativeness. Surprise does not involve valence. It involves the realization of some form of novelty. 
Confusion might involve a positive or negative feeling but not necessarily so. Puzzlement can be both 
positive as well as negative, and additionally again relates to general information processing (e.g., 
inconsistent information). Flow is typically positive, but not an event related phenomenon. Information 
about information processing can be involved in the elicitation of emotion, such as in the case of novelty 
detection, but is not a sufficient condition for emotion.  
Third, emotions are not equivalent to but grounded in bodily or homeostatic sensations. In this view not 
all feelings4 associated with positiveness or negativeness are emotions. There are many feelings that 
involve detection of harm and benefit either based on direct sensations or homeostatic processes. For 
example, pain is an unpleasant feeling, but not an emotion. Pain is always pain, it never becomes nausea 
or the perception of sucrose. Pain, just like sugar, umami, bitter, gentle touch, hunger, thirst, cold, hot, 
and many more, are hardwired signals with inherent meaning, often functioning as drives for specific 
behaviors. They arise consistently, and their meaning is not changeable. This is also the reason why I do 
not consider gustatory disgust an emotion. This form of disgust is the gustatory reaction to something 
                                                          
4 The term feeling is used in the sense explained in the introduction. 
foul tasting or unknown in the mouth focused at spitting out the thing that causes the sensation and 
preparing for throwing up. It is an inherent reaction and it is not changeable. Sensations such as pain, 
disgust and gustatory satisfaction are multimodal components of the evaluation of pleasantness (in RL 
terms the reward), but they are not emotions proper; emotions are about pleasure and displeasure 
which is more like a common currency (Cabanac, 1992). 
Forth, strongly related to Baumeister et al (Baumeister et al., 2007), I consider all emotions to be 
feedback signals in some form. Baumeister identifies feedback, anticipation and reflection as different 
signals, I consider these to be different types of feedback signals. In their simplest form emotions are 
feedback signals about the current event: how much did this event make my world better or worse? This 
is the case for joy and distress (I use joy and distress loosely as terms for the evaluation of 
positiveness/negativeness of events). In more complex forms emotions are feedback signals about 
possible future events. How desirable is a particular future event? This is the case for hope and fear (I 
use hope and fear loosely for the positiveness / negativeness of a potential future event). This is 
anticipatory feedback, the type of feedback that, when it impacts action selection, consistently biases 
behavior into a particular direction. Even more complex emotions are feedback signals reflecting upon a 
situation. This is the case for, e.g., disappointment and relief. Disappointment and relief give feedback 
about the correctness of the hope and fear signal (Reisenzein, 2009b). In essence they are corrections 
(reflective feedback) on anticipated joy and distress. The TDRL Theory of emotion is able to distinguish 
clearly between joy, relief, and hope, as well as distress, fear, and disappointment (see later). 
Fifth, emotions are manifestations of future behavioral change, in line with Frijda’s views on emotion, 
motivation and action tendencies (Frijda, 2004). Emotions motivate action in particular directions, 
because emotion is a manifestation of (future) behavioral adjustment. However, a particular emotion 
does not necessarily motivate a particular behavior. Emotional valence and intensity thereof drive the 
motivational power of an emotion, consistent with emotion as approach versus avoidance signal.  
These five criteria result in the explicit exclusion of several emotions that have been considered basic. 
For example, rage-aggression, horny-sexual drive, fear-startle, and surprise are not considered emotions 
proper, even though they are definitely serviceable habits with an associated feeling. They are 
behavioral responses to threatening stimuli or internal drives and they serve survival. However, they are 
not event-related evaluation of behavioral adjustment. All three are strong behavioral motivators but 
they are evolutionary hard-wired processes not in need of a valence assessment of an event. Surprise is 
not related to valence assessment either (see e.g. Reisenzein). Further, rage and sexual drive last longer 
than typical emotions and are not necessarily related to future behavioral change, but at resolving a 
current biological need. Further, primitive animals show these behaviors, including flies, spiders and fish. 
I define such phenomena as proto-emotions for lack of a better term, but not as emotions proper. 
To wrap up this section, I define emotions as valenced experiences in reaction to (mental) events 
providing feedback to modify future action tendencies, grounded in bodily and homeostatic sensations 
and evolutionary developed serviceable habits. 
  
Emotions and evolution.  
Emotions are a product of life with central nervous systems. So to answer the question why and how 
emotions evolved in nature I first address this question for brains in general. Nervous cells evolved to 
enable evolutionary preprogramming of reflexes for multicellular organisms. This functionality is needed 
to control the different parts of a multicellular body in response to external and internal stimuli. Central 
nervous systems evolved to do the same but in a more coordinated fashion for more complex bodies. If 
the body needs to respond as a whole, rather than as separate parts, you need a central nervous system 
with fast, myelinated, axons to coordinate that response (Susuki, 2010). As such it is safe to say that 
simple brains evolved to be able to evolutionary encode complex reflexes. The pain response, low sugar 
levels that trigger foraging behavior, and reproductive signals of the other sex triggering reproductive 
behavior are essentially complex reflex mechanisms that serve survival. 
The next step in the evolution of brains is to not only encode reflexes but also learn the appropriateness 
of reflexes. To do this, central nervous systems need two properties. First, cells need to be able to 
encode covariance (e.g., through Hebbian learning). Second, cells need to be able to inhibit rather than 
only excite other cells. With these two properties, learning is a matter of encoding co-occurrence of 
sensorimotor activity, if the nervous system is pre-wired in the right way. For example, if you are a small 
frog and swallow a green and juicy looking, but foul tasting insect, then the coactivity between nervous 
cells responsible for the biting, the sensing of the green insect, and the sensing of the foul taste 
(inhibitory neurons) is enough to reduce the probability that you will bite that insect the next time (Fig 
2). If all non-green insects taste great, than you will learn to avoid biting green insects only. 
 
Figure 2. A simple neural system for the learning and adaption of reflexes. Thick arrows represent fixed non-
adaptable connections. The red think arrow represents a fixed non-adaptable inhibitory connection. The thin 
arrows represent Hebbian connections. Low sugar levels excite biting. Foul taste inhibits biting. If biting in green 
insects consistently activates the foul taste detector, but biting in all other insects does not, than the result after 
repeated exposure is a strong excitation of the foul taste detector when green is detected, resulting in inhibition of 
biting. This effectively adapts the low sugar -> eating reflex. Of course this network needs careful setting of 
thresholds etc., and evolution had about 1000 million years to do so. 
Three essential properties of central nervous systems that allow further flexibilization of reflexes 
towards proper task learning include: dealing with delayed effects, a common currency, and play. First, 
some effects of behavior are delayed. The simple reflex adaptation network presented above cannot 
deal with such delayed effects. If you would become ill after 15 minutes, then the neurons encoding for 
green and biting are not active anymore, and the association between foul tasting and biting green stuff 
cannot be built. This severely limits survival potential of the organism. Dealing with delayed effects is 
the next big step in learning the appropriateness of reflexes. 
Second, there is a large variety of positive and negative effects (pain, hunger, thirst, gentle touch, sugary 
substances, a full belly). In order to learn tradeoffs between different, competing, behaviors it is 
essential to be able to weigh these effects. An organisms needs a common currency to decide whether 
foul tasting food is worse than starvation, or, whether being hurt is worth the effort of hunting a nice 
meal (Cabanac, 1992). I refer to this as the multimodality of positive and negative effects of behavior. 
This does not mean that such common currency needs to be encoded in the brain somewhere 
separately as a prerequisite for action selection, neither that the currency is some abstraction over the 
different sources of good and bad, but rather that a multimodal representation of value must exist as a 
consequence of an organism’s ability to deal with a variety of “good and bad” at behavior selection 
time. At some level in the neural command chain, a behavioral preference is built for hunting versus 
waiting, and that behavioral preference is a proxy for a common currency. Once this proxy exists, it can 
be used as basis for other neural calculations, such as the reward and value/utility used in TD learning. 
Optimizing pleasure and minimizing displeasure is therefore a plausible thing to try for advanced living 
species (Cabanac, 1992). 
Third, an organism needs to show behavioral flexibility (Bekoff, 2008). To enable this, an organism needs 
to generate novel behaviors and repeatedly test the effects thereof rather than to only adapt pre-
existing ones. If an animal will only try to bite when hungry, then it will never learn to bite in other 
situations, unless evolution has given it a pre-wired exciting connection between another drive and 
biting (e.g., aggression when facing rivals). This is fine for simple environments, but not for complex 
ones in which survival depends on the successful learning of complex tasks. It is impractical (and 
complexity-wise impossible) to evolutionary encode all possible reflexes that are needed to, for 
example, hunt for ants in a tree trunk with a thin stick (chimps), throw nuts before cars at traffic lights 
and then eat the nut when the lights turn red (corvids), and to drive a car through busy traffic (humans). 
Therefore, to learn novel tasks, organisms need to try out new behavior preferably in a safe 
environment. This is called play. In nature, play is strongly related to child raising for the simple reason 
that play needs to be safe otherwise it kills you. Play is the behavioral expression of exploration. 
Exploration is essential for the rewiring of existing and the learning of new reflexes. Parents are needed 
to shape the behavior (correct and motivate) as well as to restrict the environment (create the 
proverbial sandbox). Parenting and play must have co-evolved. Curiosity did not kill the cat, because it 
had parents that shaped the sandbox.  
To adapt existing reflexes and learn novel reflexes with delayed multimodal effects, an organism needs a 
common currency to evaluate what to do next, needs to associate this currency to interaction with the 
environment in the past, and needs to play in a safe environment. As we will see later, these three 
properties of organisms are represented in the computational TDRL learning method. However, here we 
focus on emotion. 
In this adaptive behavior stance towards evolutionary brain development, the question of how and why 
emotions developed almost becomes obsolete. To do all this, emotions are really not needed. However, 
as emotions are definitely observed in many animals that adapt existing reflexes and learn novel reflexes 
with delayed multimodal effects (such as birds and mammals), there must be a link. I propose that 
emotions are the manifestation of mechanisms that aid an organism to adapt and learn novel complex 
reflexes. Therefore there is a strong link between emotions and survival-rated reflexes such as sexual 
drive, aggression, and pain responses. These are very powerful and important reflexes involving strong 
drives and strong effects. The strongest and most primitive emotions must therefore be grounded in 
attempts to adapt such reflexes. However, the reflex is not an emotion. It is perhaps the behavioral 
correlate of the emotion but only in those cases where the reflex itself is triggered too. Further, emotion 
is related to valuing interaction with the environment. To do this, the notion of a common currency had 
to evolve. At least one animal even invented ways to externalize this common currency, i.e., homo 
sapiens’ concept of money. It makes sense to assume that evolution “invented” this concept much 
earlier as a way to bargain between alternatives of action and to store future potential of behavior. The 
ability to value is not the same as the ability to adapt value. The first refers to dealing with multimodality 
of effects in order to solve an action selection problem, the latter refers to increasing or decreasing the 
magnitude of the multimodal representation of effects associated with a situation. I propose that 
emotions get valence from the latter process. Put strictly, valence and intensity of an emotional episode 
is the sign and magnitude of the adaptation of the multimodal representation of effects associated with 
a situation.  
To conclude, this evolutionary and adaptive behavior view proposes that emotions are a natural 
consequence of ever more intricate adaptation of reflexes shaping complex behavioral responses to 
help survival of the individual. In later sections I explain how the TDRL perspective can shed light on 
what individual emotions are in light of this adaptation. 
Emotions and cognitive complexity. 
Emotions are intimately tied to cognitive complexity. More cognitively complex individuals and species 
have more complex and more variety of emotion. Observations from developmental psychology show 
that children start with undifferentiated distress and joy, growing up to be individuals with emotions 
including guilt, reproach, pride, and relief, all of which need significant cognitive abilities to be in 
developed. In the first months of infancy, children exhibit a narrow range of emotions, consisting of 
distress and pleasure (Sroufe, 1997). Joy and sadness emerge by 3 months, anger around 4 to 6 months 
with fear usually reported first at 7 or 8 months (Sroufe, 1997). To be able to feel anger, one needs a 
concept of self and other. To be able to feel relief, one needs the ability to anticipate distress and 
compare the anticipated distress with the actual distress. These abilities develop over time. More 
complex emotions accompany this cognitive development.  
Cognitive appraisal theory follows the same lines. Appraisals are the evaluative components associated 
with particular emotions. As proposed by Scherer, appraisals exist at different levels of complexity, and 
simpler levels are available earlier in individual development (Scherer, 2001). A baby has no way of 
detecting agency and responsibility and therefore cannot be angry at its caregivers. It can feel distress 
about not getting what it needs, but this is not the same as being angry. A toddler aged 1½ years has not 
yet developed a solid theory of mind of others. Therefore it cannot feel guilt, envy, reproach, happy-for 
and sad-for another person. Young children will take away toys from other children because they do not 
realize that the other experiences “a decrease in perceived multimodal value”. In appraisal terms they 
lack the appraisal of agency and cannot appraise whether something is beneficial or not for  someone 
else (Ortony et al., 1988). 
To conclude, the complexity of emotions depends on the cognitive complexity. This holds for individual 
development (this section) and evolutionary development (previous section). I propose that there is 
some level of cognitive complexity (which I, in lack of a better term, equate to the complexity of the 
central nervous system) that is required before one can speak of emotions. I define this necessary and  
sufficient level as the ability to process delayed multimodal effects aimed at adapting existing, and 
learning novel reflexes. Behavioral signs of the existence of emotions in organisms include play, child 
raising behavior, conflict resolution, and the ability to learn novel tasks that involve delayed rewards. 
Humans share these behaviors with a vast number of other animals, raising serious doubt about the 
often human-centered view of what emotions are and who can or cannot experience emotions. I discuss 
the ramifications of this view in light of animal welfare later in this article. 
Reinforcement Learning 
Sequential Decision Making, Reinforcement Learning and Instrumental Conditioning ++ 
In this article I argue that Temporal Difference Reinforcement Learning (TDRL) is a suitable model 
system for understanding the relation between emotion, cognition and task learning. Reinforcement 
Learning (RL) is a powerful computational model for the learning of goal oriented tasks by exploration 
and delayed reward (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Tesauro, 1995; Watkins, 1989). It can be described as 
“instrumental conditioning ++”. The key difference is that RL can learn situational action values based on 
delayed reward signals received after a trace of actions, whereas instrumental conditioning only deals 
with immediate reward/punishment. In other words, RL propagates back rewards through time in an 
attempt to solve what is called the credit assignment problem: how much credit should each action in 
the trace get based on the rewards received in that trace. RL solves a sequential decision making 
problem by learning action values for sequences of actions based on the delayed rewards. An action 
value in RL represents the immediate and expected future payoff of the action and is recursively defined 
and situation dependent. The state in RL refers to the current situation as perceived by the animal. The 
reward in RL is defined as the immediate positive (encouragement) or negative (punishment) feedback 
signals determining what should be sought after by the animal. It refers to the common currency 
mentioned above. The animal is usually referred to as the agent in RL. I use the term agent in this article 
as a reference to either animal (natural agent) or autonomous robot (artificial physical agent) or 
simulated robot / virtual character (artificial virtual agent). RL has been used successfully to enable 
agents to learn a variety of tasks (Kober, Bagnell, & Peters, 2013) as well, with the right function 
approximator, solve  control problems in many other complex domains (LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). 
In practice, RL agents learn action values by exploration and when certain enough or after a given 
amount of exploration effort the agent then uses the action values in its action selection mechanism to 
select appropriate actions in states. An important distinction in RL is thus the learning of the values 
versus the use of the values in action selection. These are separate processes. The action selection 
mechanisms typically gives more chance to higher valued (or underexplored) actions. As action values 
are learned dependent on the state, in each state an agent can learn to select different actions as long 
as there are some discriminative features of that state that make it different enough from others5. This 
effectively cause the agent to move from one state (situation) to another by sequentially selecting 
actions6.  
                                                          
5 This relates to fully observability in RL. For RL to work in practice, partial observability is sufficient in many cases.  
6 In nature this process is much less discrete and the transition between states and even between actions and 
stimuli is often continuous. 
 Figure 3. A Cartoon representation of Reinforcement Learning 
Delayed reward and the Temporal Difference signal 
Virtually all RL methods learn by updating action values based on the temporal difference error, a 
learning signal informing the agent how to adjust the value of its last action based on current and 
anticipated future rewards7. For the TDRL Theory of Emotion it suffices to assume the simplest form of 
action value learning that is based on TDRL, called SARSA (state-action-reward-state-action) (Rummery 
& Niranjan, 1994). It is representative of most other model-free forms of action value learning and is the 
easiest to explain when it comes to the dynamics of the temporal difference error. 
 [1] 
In SARSA (Figure 4, and Formula 1), the value Q(st, at) of an action at in a state st at a certain moment in 
time t is updated every time the agent visits state st and executes action at. The magnitude of the 
update depends on the reward rt received at that moment in state st after execution of action at and the 
value Q(st+1,at+1) for the action that is selected in the next state. The signal that drives the change in the 
current value Q(st, at) is expressed by the term [rt+γQ(st+1, at+1) - Q(st, at)] that is weighted by learning 
rate α. This term expresses the difference between the current value of action at in state st and the 
received reward rt in st plus the discounted value of the next action at+1 in the next state st+1. In words 
this is the update that is needed to reflect that Q(st, at) needs to encode for the current and all 
(discounted) future rewards assuming the actions typically taken by the agent. This update is the 
temporal difference error (encircled in Formula 1): the error in the prediction of the current Q(st, at) 
given a newly received reward rt and the (potentially earlier updated) estimate of Q(st+1, at+1). This error 
signal is used to drive learning while the agent is allowed to sample many state transitions allowing 
action values to converge to the cumulative expected return of actions8.  
                                                          
7 Although RL methods that do not use sampling to learn values but learn or use a state transition model, i.e., 
model-based approaches, typically do not explicitly define the TD error, it still exist and can be calculated in a 
similar way for model-based value updates. 
8 Assuming a particular policy, a Markovian world and a small enough learning rate. These assumption are 
important for learning but not important for our main argument for the link between emotion and RL.  
 Figure 4, Graphical representation of SARSA with an immediate reward and a delayed punishment. SARSA updates 
only when visiting the states (one step update). As such it takes some repetition before delayed signals are 
propagated back into the Q(s, a) of preceding actions. 
Neurobiological and psychological evidence for TDRL. 
Apart from the computational benefits of TDRL as an algorithm to learn tasks based on delayed reward, 
such as robot motor control and complex decisioning problems, TDRL has been argued to be a 
biologically plausible mechanism for animal task learning (Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 
2008; Rolls, 2014; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Different neurons seem to encode for the 
temporal difference error, reward, and action values. Further, in psychology, RL has been proposed as a 
model for understanding decision making, for example in the domain of addiction (Redish, 2004; Redish 
et al., 2007), and it has been proposed as an alternative explanation for the earlier Iowa Gambling Task 
findings (Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004). Value-based action selection 
has been proposed to occur in the basal ganglia, in concert with pre-frontal cortex reward and value 
calculation (Bogacz & Gurney, 2007; Houk et al., 2007; Tanaka et al., 2004). These ideas are in line with 
the more recently discovered functions of the prefrontal cortex involving value and TD error calculations 
(Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Suri, 2002; Tanaka et al., 2004), and the 
recently proposed role of the amygdala as a center for emotional value/valence processing (Murray, 
2007). Finally, RL agents show several striking behavioral similarities with learning and playing animals9. 
Animals develop best when they are allowed to explore behavior in a relatively safe, parented 
environment still allowing for positive and negative feedback. These are essential biological conditions 
for the genesis of play (Burghardt, 2005). This is how RL agents are trained too, by trying out random 
actions in a virtual “sand-box” updating the action values based on feedback. Curiosity, i.e., the drive to 
try out new things, is absolutely necessary for RL agents as well, and a typical strategy to drive 
exploration in computational approaches that emphasize intrinsic motivation is to overvalue untried 
actions (Singh et al., 2010). Animals learn novel tasks by rewarding desired behavior not by punishing 
undesired behavior. Frequent punishment results in inactivity and hesitation, also seen in RL agents10.  
An exhaustive review of the biological and psychological evidence for reinforcement learning is out of 
scope for this article. However, it is important to highlight three major findings that seem to be quite 
consistent and important for our argument. First, RL-based reward processing seems to occur in the 
                                                          
9 Interestingly, the original formulation of Q-learning was heavily inspired by animal learning theory (McNamara & 
Houston, 1985; Watkins, 1989). 
10 In instrumental conditioning, reward and punishment is in fact better understood as the TD error. The TD error is 
the feedback signal that makes an action more or less likely, and also depends on whether the reward was 
expected or not. 
prefrontal cortex (with different areas involved in encoding of value versus TD error), amygdala and 
basal ganglia system. Second, these areas are traditionally involved in action selection and behavior. 
Third, these areas have been historically involved in emotion processing, motivation and coping 
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996). It seems, therefore, that the areas 
that traditionally were believed to be involved in the processing of action selection and emotion, now 
also seem to be involved in RL processing. This is not surprising for action selection, as RL is about utility 
(or value)-based action selection. It is surprising that there is overlap between RL and emotion. This 
suggests that there is neurobiological evidence supporting the idea that emotion processing and reward 
processing in the RL sense are related processes in the brain. 
Outline of the Argument  
The remainder of this article focuses on the argument that emotions are manifestations of temporal 
difference processing in reinforcement learning. The claim I make is straightforward and follows from 
the conclusions about how emotions evolved, what emotions do, and how TDRL  learns.  
1) The elicitation of emotion and the TD error is similar: emotions and the temporal difference error in 
reinforcement learning are feedback signals resulting from the evaluation of a particular current 
state or (imagined/remembered) event. 
a) Emotions are valenced reactions to (mental) events elicited by an assessment of the event’s 
impact on personal relevance11.  
b) The temporal difference error estimates how much better or worse the situation just became, 
based on currently received reward and predicted future reward. 
2) The functional effect of emotion and the TD error is similar: emotions and the temporal difference 
error impact future behavior by influencing action motivation.  
a) Emotions impact future action selection either directly or by modifying action motivation.  
b) The temporal difference error updates action values.  
3) The evolutionary purpose of emotions and the TD error is similar: both emotion and the TD error 
aim for long-term survival of the agent and the optimization of well-being. 
a) Emotions aid survival of the individual as a signal that can be used to optimizing well-being.  
b) The TD error is a signal that can be used to optimize long-term reward. 
This brings us to the core of the argument summarized in the following infographic: 
 
In later sections I will provide multidisciplinary evidence for this claim. In particular I will highlight 
computational, neurobiological and psychological support. First however I focus and clarify my claim. 
  
                                                          
11 …and are grounded in bodily and homeostatic sensations and evolutionary developed serviceable habits. 
Framing and interpretation 
I propose Reinforcement Learning (RL) as a framework to study the grounding of emotion in evolution 
and development. To be precise, I intend to show that emotions are the manifestation of temporal 
difference errors. I show how this TDRL Theory of emotion provides important insights into our 
understanding of the positive and negative aspect of emotion, the event relatedness of emotion, the 
relation between emotion and other affective phenomena, the existence of emotion in other animals, 
and the relation between emotion and learning such as how more complex emotions emerge as a result 
of cognitive complexity.  
In line with (Murray, 2007), it is important to realize that I do not claim that emotion and (an abstract 
representation of) reward/punishment are identical. Reward/punishment and emotion are not the 
same. First, reward processing is necessary for TD error processing but not equivalent. Reward in RL is a 
subjective12 measure of goodness while the TD error is the adjustment of the action value13. This 
adjustment is derived from the reward signal, but also depends on an estimate of the value of the 
current situation (see section on RL above). So, the TD error signal is distinct from the reward signal. 
Second, even if an evaluation results in a common currency used to compare or update actions, this 
must be still built on top of the biological wetware of a body and what is good or bad for that body. 
Emotions are therefore not simply an abstract utility because this utility must have biological grounding. 
Of course at some point an adjustment needs to be made to make an action more or less likely to be 
selected in the future, and this needs to be a “coding of action motivation”, but this code refers to 
something real and felt. To put it differently, action motivation is grounded in the multimodal physiology 
of reward and punishment (e.g., pain, smell, touch, disgust) as well as homeostatic processes that 
manage low-level urges and senses of well-being (e.g., sugar level, hunger, satisfaction) . At some point 
the action’s motivational value is coded on a more abstract level (perhaps in the amygdala (Murray, 
2007)), because a decision needs to be made, but the importance of the different reward modalities 
may very well change over time depending on the current physiological state and intrinsic motivational 
factors. This means that to properly understand the relation between emotion and adaptive behavior in 
general, one needs to study and simulate physiology because that is the basis for reward and 
punishment and hence the abstract encoding of value. Also in the TDRL Theory of Emotion, emotion is 
grounded in physiology, homeostasis, hormones, and the drive to survive. 
I do not claim that all animal species have emotions. I claim that the attribution of emotion to animal 
species is linked to that species’ ability to compute TD-like action value updates. If a brain lacks the 
processing capacity to do this, then it also lacks the ability to realize that the world got better or worse, 
and it definitely lacks the ability to anticipate adjustment. Instrumental conditioning might be sufficient 
for emotions of joy and distress, if one assumes that the TD error is what is referred to as reward in this 
                                                          
12 The standard view is that reward is an objective measure form the environment but the intrinsic motivation 
literature in RL (Singh et al., 2010) proposes a more plausible subjective view on the reward signal, fully compatible 
with TDRL Emotion theory as even when using intrinsically motivated reward signals a TD error is calculated to 
update action values. 
13 In some formulations of RL the adjustment is a state value adjustment rather than an action value adjustment. 
This difference is not important for our discussion. 
process14. If the conditioning is realized with a relatively straightforward neural architecture that enables 
the conditioning of reflexes (see Figure 2), it might not be sufficient.  
Relatedly, I do claim that many animal species have emotions. As soon as one can observe RL-like 
behavior (exploration, child care, task learning based on delayed rewards, conflict resolution, to name a 
few) it makes sense to talk about emotions proper. The set of animals with emotions therefore is huge.  
Further, I propose an important role for social processes in emotions. I believe that social emotions are 
strongly grounded in RL. I will come back to this later, but in a nutshell: why would you care if someone 
is angry at you, and, why is guilt (a) a bad feeling and (b) a useful feedback signal to you? I believe there 
is a very simple reason that resonates with reinforcement learning: angry people communicate to you 
that they had to negatively adjust their situation due to something they think you had a hand in. 
Expression of anger is the direct social signal translation of that negative internal feedback signal, and, 
its function is to decrease the receiver’s action tendency of the blameworthy action. In a very real sense, 
the expression of anger is the communication of a negative TD signal to the one to whom the expression 
is directed. If successfully communicated, guilt is your internal feedback signal reflecting the adjustment 
of your motivation to repeat your offensive action15. Showing guilt is again the direct social signal 
translation of that internal signal, intended to communicate that the message has arrived and 
incorporated in future action motivation. Many emotions have a social signal component and an internal 
evaluative component. The internal component always relates to the adjustment of action value, the TD 
error, in ever more complex situations. In social species it is beneficial to evolve the capability to process 
agency-related information in order to realize that someone had some form of action responsibility.  It is 
also beneficial to evolve social signals to resolve conflict and avoid physical harm due to fighting. Non-
social species probably lack emotions such as anger and guilt, not because they lack emotions altogether 
but because there was never any need to (a) process responsibility/agency and (b) communicate 
corrective signals. I would be comfortable claiming that dogs feel anger and guilt, but frogs do not.  
Finally, I do not claim that machines that implement reinforcement learning to adapt their behavior feel 
anything. I claim that such machines simulate emotions. The simulation of a phenomenon is not the 
same as that phenomenon itself. A weather simulation does not create rain. A simulation of atoms 
forming molecules does not create actual chemistry. By simulating emotions I do not create feelings. 
Further, feeling is a term to be avoided in artificial beings because it refers to the experiential and 
machines cannot - at least at this point - experience anything in the naturalistic sense16.  
  
                                                          
14 Although in classical instrumental conditioning there is no reference made to delayed reward processing. In RL 
terms instrumental conditioning can best be described as a multi-armed bandid problem.  
15 Of course guilt can arise in the absence of someone expressing anger. This interaction flow is presented as an 
example. 
16 This strongly relates to the hard problem of consciousness, qualia and whether or not consciousness is a natural 
phenomenon, i.e., a phenomenon that emerges from neurons just like molecules are an emergent phenomenon 
emerging from atoms.  
Emotions are Manifestations of Temporal Difference Processing 
The core of the TDRL Theory of Emotion is that all emotions are manifestations of temporal difference 
error. As argued above, the essence of an emotion is that there is positive or negative valence 
associated with it, that intensity and sign of valence is relative to what the individual is used to, and that 
emotions are involved in future behavioral change. Before discussing detailed evidence in favor of this 
proposal, I explain what this TD interpretation means for the emotions of joy, distress, hope and fear. I 
use these labels for particular emotions throughout this article. These labels refer to specific underlying 
temporal difference calculation processes and should not be taken literally or as a complete reference to 
all possible emotions that might exist in the categories that these labels typically refer to in psychology. 
In this view, joy (distress when negative) refers to the positive (negative) temporal difference error 
(Figure 5).  Based on an assessment of the values of different actions, an agent selects and executes one 
of those actions and arrives at a new situation. If this situation is such that the action deserves to be 
selected more (less) often, either because the reward was higher (lower) than expected or the situation 
is better (worse) than expected resulting in a positive (negative) temporal difference signal, the action 
value is updated accordingly. This update manifests itself as joy (distress). Joy and distress are therefore 
emotions that refer to the now, to actual situations and events. 
The joy/distress signal - or in RL terms the temporal difference error - is also the building block for hope 
(fear). Hope (fear) refers to the anticipation of a positive (negative) temporal difference error (Figure 6). 
To explain fear and hope in the TDRL Theory of Emotion, the agent needs to have a mental model of the 
agent-environment interactions that is able to represent uncertainty and is used by the agent to 
anticipate. In RL this is referred to as model-based RL. In this case, the agent not only learns action value 
estimates (model-free RL, such as SARSA) but also learns probabilities associated with action-
environment transitions P( s’| s, a), i.e., what next state s’ to expect as a result of result action a in state 
s. Fear and hope result from the agent’s mental simulation of such transitions to potential future states. 
If the agent simulates transitions to next possible next states (either through its own actions in the 
environment or actions of other agents) and at some point a positive (negative) temporal difference 
error is triggered, then that agent knows that for this particular future there is also a positive (negative) 
adjustment needed for the current state/action. However, as this positive adjustment refers to a 
potential future transition, it doesn’t feel exactly like joy (distress). It is similar, but not referring to the 
actual action that has been selected. How fear (hope) is incorporated in adjusting current action values 
to change behavior is not relevant here (I discuss this later). The point is that fear (hope) shares a basic 
ingredient with joy (distress), i.e., the temporal difference error assessment. There is a qualitative 
difference though, which has to do with the cognitive processing involved in generating the signal: while 
joy and distress are about the now, hope and fear are about anticipated futures.  
    
Figure 5. Schematic for joy at the left (distress on the right). The agent / animal selects an action and 
ends up in a next state, resulting in a positive (negative) temporal difference error, which results in an 
increase (decrease) of the motivation for that action, which in instrumental conditioning is equivalent to 
a reward (punishment), resulting in the most basic positive (negative) emotion I would label joy 
(distress). 
   
Figure 6. Schematic for hope at the left (fear on the right). The animal imagines a possible future next 
state that when attained would trigger a positive (negative) temporal difference error, which would 
result in an increase (decrease) of the motivation for that action, which in instrumental conditioning is 
equivalent to the anticipation of a reward (punishment), resulting in a slightly more complex basic 
positive (negative) emotion I would label hope (fear). 
  
Computational, Psychological and Neurobiological evidence  
In this section I discuss computational, psychological and neurobiological evidence supporting the TDRL 
Theory of Emotion. Evidence is grouped into three themes: similarities in the elicitation conditions of 
emotion and temporal difference errors, similarities in their functional effects, and similarities in their 
evolutionary and developmental purpose. 
The elicitation of emotion and the TD error is similar. 
With regards to emotion elicitation I discuss three important aspects: the situational circumstances that 
trigger the emotion, the valence of the emotion, and the intensity over time. I show that there are 
important similarities between emotion elicitation and TD error elicitation on these three aspects.  
The vast majority of emotion theories propose that emotions arise from personally meaningful 
(imagined) changes in the current situation. An emotion occurs when a change is personally meaningful 
to the agent, i.e., when that change makes it more or less likely for the agent to result in a desirable 
situation. For example in cognitive appraisal theories the emotion is often described as a valenced 
reaction resulting from the assessment of personal relevance of an event (Moors et al., 2013; Ortony et 
al., 1988; Scherer, 2001). The assessment is based on what the agent believes to be true and what it 
aims to achieve as well as its perspective on what is desirable for others. In theories that emphasize 
biology, behavior, and evolutionary benefit (Frijda, 2004; Jaap Panksepp, 1998), the emotion is more 
directly related to action selection but the elicitation condition is similar: an assessment of harm versus 
benefit resulting in a serviceable habit aimed at adapting the behavior of the agent. Strongly cognitive 
views such as the one proposed by Reisenzein (Reisenzein, 2009b) assume that the mechanism by which 
this assessment is made is based on processes that check for congruency in the believes and goals the 
agent holds. For example, if the agent detects that a change in the current situation results in believing 
that a desirable (goal) state becomes true – i.e., the desired state and the current state are congruent - 
then that would trigger joy. Scherer (Scherer, 2001) proposes that the processes based on which this 
assessment is made can be split up into two: one based on biological congruence (intrinsic pleasantness) 
and one based on schematic congruence. Key is that in all these theories emotions are the result of a 
personally relevant change in the situation of the agent. Also in computational models that simulate 
emotions based on either cognitive appraisal theories (João Dias & Paiva, 2005; S. C. Marsella & Gratch, 
2009; Popescu, Broekens, & Someren, 2014; Steunebrink, Dastani, & Meyer, 2008) or biological drives 
and internal motivation (Cañamero, 2003; Cos, Cañamero, Hayes, & Gillies, 2013) emotions always arise 
due to (internal) changes that are assessed as personally relevant.  
The temporal difference error by definition arises exclusively from changes in the current situation and 
is related to personal relevance. TD errors arise if and only if (a) there is a state transition, and, (b) the 
transition generates a difference in expected return. The first means that only if there is a perceived 
change in the situation a TD error will arise. The second means that only if that change is assessed as 
personally meaningful - it increases or decreases the expected current and cumulative future reward – 
the TD error will be other than zero. In the TDRL theory of emotion, the desirability of a change is 
operationalized by the increase or decrease of the expected current and cumulative future payoff. This 
thus matches with the general elicitation conditions of an emotion: personally relevant and change 
driven.  
There are important specific similarities in the elicitation conditions of emotion between TDRL emotion 
theory and other emotion theories. Most obviously it relates to the neurobiological theory of emotion 
by Rolls (Rolls, 2000), who proposes that emotions are the result of (absence of expected) reward and 
punishment. The TDRL theory differs in that it does not propose special roles for reward versus 
punishment for the elicitation of emotions and it generalizes the process of how anticipation-related 
emotions, such as fear and hope, arise. Further, TDRL emotion theory clearly separates between 
emotions proper (event-related valenced reactions of different complexity) and proto-emotions 
(including rage, sexual drive, pain, hunger). It also proposes how emotions of higher complexity develop 
due to cognitive complexity.  
Further, also on the cognitive side there are important similarities in elicitation conditions. For example 
Reisenzein (Reisenzein, 2009b) proposes that there are two metacognitive processes of high importance 
for emotion elicitation: desirability (of a state) and likelihood (of that state to be true). The desirability of 
a state in Reisenzein’s view directly matches with the TD error; desirable state are states you want to be 
true and states you want to be true are states with a positive TD error because those are the states that 
help you further optimize well-being. These states are in essence you goals. The likelihood matches with 
the probability that a particular state can be reached. There are two ways in which an agent can assess 
the likelihood of a state in model-based RL: first, the current state is certain by definition as it is actually 
happening now, second, the likelihood of future states can be assessed be querying a transition model 
in model-based RL. The emotions of joy and distress in Reisenzein’s theory arise when a desired state 
has become certain (likelihood of 1). Reisenzein proposes this to be processes over symbolic 
representation, but this constraint is not needed for RL agents. For example, model-free RL, such as 
SARSA, can simulate joy and distress using the TD error in line with Reisenzein’s proposal. For the 
emotions of hope and fear an anticipatory model of the environment is needed: to simulate hope and 
fear based on TD errors, we need model-based RL. For more detail on a potential mapping between RL 
and Reisenzein see (T. Moerland, Broekens, & Jonker, 2016). It is also possible to computationally 
formulate Scherer’s appraisal processes in terms of RL primitives. Scherer (Scherer, 2001) proposes that 
the process of appraisal is split into different stimulus evaluation checks that operate at different levels 
of cognitive complexity. Again, the stimulus is a change in the current situation and the relevance, 
implications and whether or not the agent can cope with the change are then assessed. Scherer does 
not emphasize the labels of the emotions but rather focusses on the structure and flow of the appraisal 
process. First the relevance of the stimulus is assessed at different levels of complexity (suddenness, 
novelty, intrinsic pleasantness). This matches to the state change in RL and the associated reward signal 
strength. Almost immediately after that the implications are assessed. Most relevant for our current 
discussion is the assessment of conduciveness as this defines the desirability of the change. 
Conduciveness matches with the TD error. In (Jacobs, 2013) we propose a complete mapping between 
RL and Scherer’s SEC’s as well as the OCC model including an analysis of what these appraisal processes 
could mean in terms of RL-related learning signals. Although some of those mappings may later prove to 
be wrong, the essence is that for most appraisal processes (Ortony et al., 1988; Reisenzein, 2009b; 
Scherer, 2001) (except agency and norms related ones) an analogy can be found in terms of TDRL.  
Another important observation is that the TDRL Theory of Emotion proposes a natural continuum 
towards more complex emotions based on the cognitive development of the individual or species. 
Joy/distress are manifestations of the TD error. For this there is no need for a model of the 
environment-agent interactions, i.e., no model-based RL. Hope/fear is modeled by anticipated TD error. 
For this we need an anticipatory model (see more on this later in this section). To do this an agent needs 
to be able to imagine the future and assess the uncertainty of that future. The TDRL theory of emotion 
thus predicts that cognitively advanced species able to do so will most likely also experience fear- and 
hope-like emotions 
The second aspect of emotion elicitation I discuss is emotional valence. The vast majority of emotion 
theories propose that an emotion is an evaluation of positive versus negative. This is true for cognitive 
appraisal theories (Moors et al., 2013; Ortony et al., 1988), theories emphasizing action and motivation 
(Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Frijda, 2004), theories that focus on social evaluation 
(Fischer & Manstead, 2008), and theories that focus on basic survival needs and adaptive behavior (Jaap 
Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 2000). In all these theories the emotional episode is an assessment of whether an 
(imagined) event is conducive, appetitive, pleasant  (positive valence) versus obstructive, defensive, 
unpleasant (negative valence). Further supporting evidence for the fundamental role of valence is found 
in affective factor analysis of a wide variety of stimuli as well as verbal reports. A consistent finding is 
that the most explanatory factor for variance in emotions/words/attitudes and sentiments is valence, 
typically accounting for about 35% or more of the variance (J. R. Fontaine, K. R. Scherer, E. B. Roesch, & 
P. C. Ellsworth, 2007). Finally, in Social Signal Processing, valence is often found to be the best 
detectable social signal in facial expression, sentiment analysis and bodily behavior (Vinciarelli et al., 
2012). Of course, valence is not enough to explain or describe all emotions, but valence is a fundamental 
aspect of emotional episodes. There is some debate (Macedo, Cardoso, Reisenzein, Lorini, & 
Castelfranchi, 2009; Ortony et al., 1988; Reisenzein, 1994, 2009a) on whether or not a neutral form of 
surprise should also be considered an emotion. Surprise could for example result from low-level 
assessment of novelty (Scherer, 2001), or, from the assessment of belief-belief congruence (Reisenzein, 
2009b) i.e., a stimulus forces you to update your belief but there is no associated desirability with that 
belief). This type of surprise elicitation without valence is possible but in my view it is a definitional issue 
rather than a fundamental issue about the mechanism of emotion elicitation. “Neutral” surprise in 
nature seems to rare in the first place, and second, when it arises it mostly relates to information 
processing and sensory information uptake (vigilance, attention). In essence surprise is perhaps better 
defined as a state that a neural information processing system can be in (like sleep, flow and confusion). 
The TD error in RL is always an assessment of positive versus negative. The TD error is positive (negative) 
if the state transition results in a higher (lower) than expected reward and cumulative future reward. 
This assessment is relative to the agent’s “goals”, where a goal in the TDRL sense is an anticipated future 
state with associated joy (i.e., a state you hope for). If a transition brings the agent closer to such as 
state, then the TDRL signal is positive and vice versa. If we simulate joy and distress as the TD error, then 
joy is elicited if the agent assesses the situation to be better than expected and vice versa for distress. 
(see Figure 5). The issue of whether or not neutral emotions exist (e.g. surprise) is dealt with by the fact 
that a TD can be zero but that would not result in any positive or negative valence. The event might still 
be unexpected (highly salient), and this can have behavioral and experiential consequences but is not 
related to “good or bad”. Another issue, the correlation found in many studies between arousal and the 
absolute value of valence, e.g. in (J. R. J. Fontaine, K. R. Scherer, E. B. Roesch, & P. C. Ellsworth, 2007)), is 
also explained by the TD error interpretation. The more important the TD error (either positive or 
negative) is, the more likely the event was salient as well and the more likely action tendencies are 
changed. Highly salient events as well as changes in action tendencies are important aspects driving 
arousal through attentional resources and action readiness. Modelling joy and distress with the TD error 
therefore provides a natural explanation for the observed relation between arousal and valence.  
Although it is tempting to equate the reward signal in RL itself to the positiveness / negativeness of the 
emotion, I argue, in line with e.g. (Murray, 2007), that this cannot be true for several reasons. Most of 
these are related to the fact that emotions are relative assessments with intensity dynamics that are 
more compatible with the TD error than the reward (see below). Two intuitive experiential aspects can 
be put forward too. First, rewards in nature are of specific types while emotions are more like a 
common motivational currency. In nature, reward is grounded in homeostasis / neurotransmitters and 
pleasure/pain centers. Reward is a multimodal primary reinforcer, it is about (dis)liking a stimulus for 
particular biological reasons, such as sugary food , gentle touch or pain. Emotions are not “multimodal 
feelings”, you don’t feel “money joy” versus “holiday joy”, or, “pain fear” versus “loss fear”. The 
positive/negative aspect of fear, joy, and all other emotions is a feeling of a single common “currency”. 
Of course the agent still feels (anticipation of) pain or monetary loss as different things, but fear will be 
fear and joy will be joy. Second, emotions are experienced relative to the current situation. When you 
lose half of your one-million fortune you end up at the same amount of money as when you win your 
first half million. However, the feeling associated with these events is completely opposite. In the latter 
case, you could feel joy still owning half a million, taking the “no money” reference point, or, feel 
distressed about just losing the money taking the “one million” reference point. In the TDRL 
interpretation emotional valence and intensity depend on your TD error reference point. This aligns with 
Mellers’ Affect Decision Theory explaining that unexpected outcomes have a higher emotional impact 
not due to the utility of the outcome but due to the unexpectedness (Mellers et al., 1997). Our TD 
theory of Emotion explains this because the TD update is larger in the case of unexpected outcomes, 
which can be simulated during the exploration phase of in computo learning task (Broekens, Jacobs, & 
Jonker, 2015). In line with findings on for example emotional coping, the emotional interpretation of an 
event (the perspective an individual takes during reappraisal) is rather flexible in human adults (Folkman 
& Lazarus, 1990).  
I now turn to the third aspect of emotion elicitation: emotional intensity. The dynamics of the temporal 
difference error are compatible with the dynamics of joy and distress and provides a basis for the 
dynamics of fear and hope and even more complex emotions. To discuss emotional intensity, I focus on 
several key time-related emotion intensity modifiers: habituation, extinction, and regulation. Emotion 
habituation is the process of reacting less to repeated exposure of emotion eliciting stimuli, very similar 
to the process of habituation to reinforcers. Extinction is usually discussed in the context of fear 
extinction (Myers & Davis, 2006), and refers to the process of reacting less strong to repeated exposure 
to fear conditioned stimuli. In particular the process called new learning is relevant for our discussion. 
New learning explains fear extinction by proposing that novel associations with the previously fear-
conditioned stimulus become more important after repeated presentation of that stimulus. This results 
in a decrease in fear response, not because the fear association is forgotten but because alternative 
outcomes become more important. Regulation, here, refers to the process of up- or downregulating 
emotional intensity of emotions due to the active imagination of a future situation. Depending on the 
details of the imagination process, emotions are either exaggerated or inhibited and the effect is 
different for imagined and actual emotions. I will show that the TDRL Theory of Emotion helps to explain 
habituation, extinction and regulation in a unified way. 
If we adopt the view that emotions are adaptation-related feedback signals then emotions must be 
related to change, i.e., an emotion signals an important change. If there are no important changes 
(imagined or real), then emotions should be absent. If an agent has fully learnt to deal with its 
environmental challenges, then it does not need to change its behavior anymore and as a result does 
not receive any feedback signals to that end, hence it has no salient emotions17. This is observed in 
nature as well. Stable and predictable situations tend to be rather emotionless, while unstable, and 
unpredictable situations tend to elicit strong emotions. This is an indication that emotions are not 
related to the absolute value of the situation. One can win the lottery, and this elicits strong emotions, 
but there is no measurable difference in joy or even perceived quality of life one year after such an 
event (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978). The same is true for negative events: people are very 
bad at predicting how they would feel a year after a major negative life event, and in general feel much 
better than they had predicted (Brickman et al., 1978). This leads me to conclude that the “absolute” 
value of states and actions in the RL mechanism are not a model for the emotions of joy or distress. 
Resultingly, the RL reward signal is also not a good model because value is the cumulative discounted 
future reward. 
This discussion brings us to the first phenomenon, habituation. Repeated exposure to a rewarded 
stimulus (Figure 7) results in gradually less intense emotional reactions; we get used to it. Finally, when 
the reward is removed after habitation, the response is negative. The typical explanation is that we 
come to anticipate the response. In the TDRL interpretation, this means the reward got fully integrated 
in the state or action value due to repeated exposure, explaining the less intense response. When the 
reward is absent after habituation there is a negative TD and the state/value action is adjusted. This is 
distress. The TD error model explains emotional habituation. Rewards or state/action value does not. 
Both represent an objective quantity. Reward and values converge to stable values. A world full of 
rewards converges to a very high overall value for all of its states. This would feel very comfortable, but 
the joy associated with this world would definitely decrease over time. 
In a similar manner, fear and hope cannot refer to the value of an action or state, even though it is 
tempting to propose that fear and hope are anticipations of high or low value (Broekens et al., 2015). If 
an agent learns to deal with a particular environment, the value of states/actions converge to a stable 
value. This is an arbitrary absolute value. In such a converged situation, the agent will not fear or hope 
things that are completely known and to which the agent is fully used to. What one fears (hopes) is 
distress (joy). Fear is thus anticipated distress, and hope is anticipated joy.  
To explain fear (and hope) extinction in the TDRL Theory of Emotion, we need a model of the agent-
environment interactions that is able to represent uncertainty and used by the agent to anticipate. In RL 
this is referred to as model-based RL. In this case, the agent learns a model of the action-environment 
statistics P( s’| s, a), i.e., what next states s’ to expect as a result of an action a in particular state s. As 
distress and joy are well modelled by the TD error, fear and hope are proposed to be anticipated TD 
errors using such an anticipatory model of the agent-environment relationship. Fear and hope are again 
signals that indicate important behavioral adaptation but now in the future. These signals habituate, as 
repeated exposure to predictable outcomes will result in the absence of TD errors. The only way to keep 
fear and hope existing is in the face of uncertainty, or, during learning. In the latter case (learning) the 
                                                          
17 This of course does not exclude the possibility that the agent experiences all kinds of other affective states due 
to remembering events, associations with stimuli, relations with other agents, moods, drives, etc. 
agent is still integrating rewards and learning the consequence of actions. If the agent comes to realize 
that a particular action causes distress in the future, it experiences fear at that same moment as it 
anticipates a negative TD (and vice versa for joy/hope/positive). In the former case (uncertainty), even if 
an agent has fully learned to act in an environment the agent can experience fear and hope if TD errors 
are stochastic. Walking along a dangerous mountain trail is frightening because you initially estimate the 
odds of slipping to be quite high. After a couple of hours walking, you have revisited these states many 
times and the odds are lowered, hence your feeling of fear is too. However, actively imagining the 
consequences of falling and the many ways in which you could indeed slip will enhance your fear 
experience. This also explains fear extinction by the process of new learning (Myers & Davis, 2006). 
Repeated visits of a previously fear conditioned stimulus result in lower fear because of new 
(more/heavier) connections with alternative outcomes. The fear is not forgotten but the fearful 
outcome is assessed as less likely. A more positive example is the buying of a lottery ticket that 
generates hope, not because one is learning and only realizes sitting behind the TV set that one might 
win, but because the outcome is uncertain and very positive. Anticipation of the potential joy (positive 
TD error) as a result of actual winning produces hope. 
This example bridges nicely to the phenomenon of regulation. When all your lottery numbers are 
correct except the last one, that last wrong number generates a lot of distress of a particular kind: 
disappointment. After every correct number you incorporate a bit of the positive TD error in your 
current state. That is also why you feel so joyful just before you realize the last number is incorrect. All 
these correct numbers generate small positive TD’s, even though you know you are not rich yet, the 
odds of getting rich increase every time with a correct number. It doesn’t matter if these are real odds 
or perceived odds. When the final number is shown and is not correct, you have to downgrade your 
situational value. In the TDRL Theory of Emotion, this is exactly what disappointment is, and it is in line 
with Reisenzein: the degree to which an anticipated amount of joy is in fact less than the actual amount 
of joy (Reisenzein, 2009b). This is again a TD error, accompanied by an even more complex cognitive 
state, a state that requires an anticipatory model and a memory enabling you to realize that you just 
negatively adjusted a value that was too positively adjusted based on previous anticipation 
(counterfactual thinking, imagination). Any animal able to imagine future rewards and punishments will 
experience hope and fear, but only those animals able to realize that the update was based on 
assumptions about the future will experience disappointment as a special case of distress (or relief as a 
special kind of joy). The rest simply experiences distress (with an expression that of course looks almost 
the same).  
The last paragraph explains by example what healthy regulation does with the intensity of emotions. 
Regulation by anticipation brings the emotional event closer to the now, resulting in two important 
phenomena. First, the intensity of the expected emotion is spread out, because the TD error is already 
incorporated to some extent for the entire chain up until the emotional event. You feel a little bit of the 
event before it has happened. Second, when the event arises, it is less intense because some of the TD 
error has already been incorporated. Convincing yourself that you will fail an exam makes failing it 
slightly less bad. You feel the event but regulated. I propose several important behavioral functions for 
this in the next section. Also in the next section I explain what unhealthy anticipation does and why it 
does this from an RL point of view. 
As a last note on habituation and regulation, but now on a longer time scale, consider the difference in 
emotion intensity between children and adults. The typically high-level explanation is that adults have a 
more developed prefrontal cortex, that the prefrontal cortex is involved in inhibition, regulation and 
control, and hence children are less able to control their emotions. The TDRL Theory of Emotion 
proposes an alternative explanation. Adults are converged agents, they are relatively finished in terms 
of learning and therefore rarely experience strong TD errors. Adults are “stable” in the sense that they 
have a fully developed model of how they interact with the world and what that means in terms of 
rewards. As such, it is to be expected that adults experience less intense and less frequent emotions 
compared to children, for two reasons: most of their behavior is built out of habits, and, they are able to 
anticipate and therefore spread out large fluctuations in TD errors. This is compatible with the more 
recently discovered functions of the prefrontal cortex involving value and TD error calculations (Berridge 
et al., 2009; Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Suri, 2002; Tanaka et al., 2004). It is also compatible with the view 
propose earlier that emotions are a natural consequence of the need for ever more intricate adaptation 
of reflexes shaping complex behavioral responses to help survival of the individual. If such behavioral 
feedback signals are less frequent, emotions should be less frequent too. 
In this section I showed how the TDRL Theory of Emotion can be used to understand the elicitation 
conditions, emotional valence and intensity of emotions. I explained how the TD error models joy and 
distress, and how form that hope, fear, disappointment and relief emerge given more cognitive 
complexity. I proposed a TD error explanation for the effect of habituation, fear extinction and 
anticipation on emotion intensity.  
 
Figure 7. Graphical schema of habituation of joy due to the repeated result of giving flowers to someone 
(iconic face), ending in distress when the rewarding stimulus is not presented after habituation. 
The functional effect on behavior of emotion and the TD error is similar 
Emotions are tied to motivation, action and action tendencies (Frijda, 2004; Jaap Panksepp, 1998). 
Specific behaviors are often proposed to be related to specific emotions: fear and fleeing, anger and 
fighting, joy and play, sexual drive and mating behavior, to name just a few. Emotions are also tied to 
behavioral feedback, reflection and anticipation (Baumeister et al., 2007). Finally, emotions are essential 
for decision making and action (Damasio, 1994). The difference in these views is not about the ultimate 
function of emotion, i.e., to influence future action, but about what comes first: does the emotion cause 
the action, does the emotion provide feedback about the action, does the emotion cause bodily 
changes, do the bodily changes cause an emotion. I propose that the TDRL Theory of Emotion sheds 
light on how this process works. 
In Reinforcement Learning the motivation for action is encoded as action value. RL essentially is about 
learning to select appropriate actions. Appropriate means “optimizing cumulative future reward”. The 
action value in RL thus models motivational value. There is evidence that RL-like motivational action 
value is also encoded in the brain (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Tanaka et al., 2004). The value of an 
action in RL is a direct driver for the selection of that action, computationally represented as some form 
of probabilistic action selection rule  (Formula 2). This probabilistic selection can vary from begin very 
random, read exploratory behavior, to very selective, read goal oriented.   
Action values are incrementally updated by the temporal difference error. The TD error is an adjustment 
of the action value based on new evidence after having executed an action (Formula 1). There is also 
evidence that TD errors are encoded in the prefrontal cortex (Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Suri, 2002). 
   [2] 
If emotions are the manifestations of TD errors, then this explains why emotions are related to 
motivation, motivational change, feedback on actions, and action readiness all at the same time. The 
neural calculation of the TD error drives the motivational change as it updates the action value. It 
thereby functions as a feedback signal that changes the action value. Any action that becomes strongly 
motivated must also be emotionally relevant because this involves an important TD error. Especially 
when an agent has an anticipatory model (as explained above), this interpretation makes sense. 
Consider a hungry agent in a state of choice. One option leads to nothing particular, the other option 
leads to a great meal. If the agent is able to anticipate this meal to some extent, then, following our 
model of hope/joy, the agent will propagate back some of the anticipated joy to the current state of 
choice. This must also increase the motivational value of the option leading to the meal. It also makes 
the agent feel hopeful (again, hope is just a label here). As a result the agent prepares for the 
approaching action and starts committing to it. This process is easily simulated in model-based RL (T. 
Moerland et al., 2016). This shows that the anticipation of a positive TD can alter current action 
motivation and produce feelings of positive anticipation (to avoid the label of hope for once). This 
explanation obviously also holds for fear and the avoidance of distress, and it neatly ties together 
emotion, motivational change and action. It also provides a natural continuum for the three types of 
Baumeister “feedback” (Baumeister et al., 2007): feedback, anticipation and reflection. All three are 
essentially the same type of feedback signal, but executed at different time scales and hence in need of 
increasingly complex cognitive capabilities. Feedback is about joy and distress and “is” the TD error. The 
anticipation emotions hope and fear are about anticipated joy and distress, but as joy and distress are 
feedback signals, both hope and fear are also feedback, but they are feedback about an anticipated 
future. This ties hope and fear strongly to motivation. Reflective emotions such as disappointment 
(relief) are about the difference between anticipated joy and actual joy (distress). Again, the signal is a 
TD error. The reflection part is due to the realization that the TD error could have been different. This 
requires even more cognitive sophistication. Although Baumeister and Reisenzein formulate their 
emotions differently, the TDRL Theory proposes that they are in agreement about what emotions are.  
We see that the TDRL Theory of Emotion is able to integrate these different theoretical views and ties 
emotions to a computational method that is functionally able to learn and develop highly complex tasks 
as well as is grounded in neurobiology. The TDRL Theory of Emotion can also explain and predict a 
variety of cognitive-affective phenomena, some of which are functional while others are maladaptive. I 
will proceed to highlight several. 
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A well-known phenomenon in psychology is that strong anticipations of positive or negative outcomes 
create a reversed effect when the anticipated event does not follow through or has only moderately 
rewarding or punishing effects. The stronger the anticipation of gain (loss) the stronger the 
disappointment (relief) (Reisenzein, 2009b). The TDRL Theory explains this as follows. If you simulate 
(anticipate) a trace towards a joyful future, you feel the positive TD error, but also incorporate a little bit 
of it in the trace already, which is necessary for action motivation towards that “goal”, as explained 
above. By the time you arrive several things can happen. If you underestimated the gain, you will still 
feel joy because the TD is positive. If you overestimated the gain, you will feel a particular form of 
distress I label as disappointment because the TD is negative due to the needed negative adjustment.   
Healthy anticipation thus has an adaptive function for at least two reasons: it drives motivation and goal 
oriented behavior, and, it regulates extreme TD errors by smoothing over the anticipated trace. This is 
useful in both the positive (hope) and negative case (fear).  
Unhealthy positive anticipation is characterized by strong positive TD errors based on an anticipated 
future resulting in elation and regular disappointment (in the hope case), and, strong negative TD errors 
based on an anticipated future resulting in a lot of distress (in the fear case). This mechanism is an 
interesting candidate for an explanation of bipolar disorder (manic depression) characterized by 
alternating optimistic versus pessimistic modes of at least a week18. If you flip-flop between 
incorporating very positive TD errors on the one hand and very negative TD errors on the other, than the 
observed behavior (also “in computo”) is extreme motivation and joy while going for high gains with 
small odds followed by strong disappointment, flipping to inactivity, distress and worrying explained by 
the constant anticipation of negative TD errors for all possible actions. The TDRL Theory of Emotion thus 
suggests that bipolar disorder is a stability disorder of TD error anticipation and regulation. 
We performed in computo simulation of how the intensity of fear is modulated by perception of control, 
amount and depth of rumination and closeness of threat (T. Moerland et al., 2016). Individuals with high 
perception of control believe that they control their own actions, that their actions will not fail and that 
those actions will have a predictable, usually deterministic, outcome. Individuals with a high perception 
of control typically are less fearful and take more risk (Horswill & McKenna, 1999).  In our lab we 
manipulated in computo experiments the amount of control individuals assumed they had when 
anticipating walking along a slippery cliff. Individuals with higher perception of control experienced less 
fear than individuals with lower perception of control. Perception of control was operationalized as the 
mental action selection strategy (more versus less randomness in action selection). Rumination involves 
repeated mental simulation of possible future interactions with the environment. High levels of 
rumination produced higher levels of fear. We also simulated the amount of internally simulated traces 
while walking along the cliff. More simulation again produced higher fear intensity. Closeness of threat 
refers to the temporal closeness of harm. Simulation results showed that when the cliff closer, fear 
intensity is higher. These studies show that when fear is simulated as anticipated future TD error signals, 
we are able to replicate in computo three important findings from psychology.  
Finally we address the correlation between sensation-seeking, risk-taking behaviour, pathological 
gambling, and (perception of) control over event outcomes (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Fortune & 
Goodie, 2010; Horswill & McKenna, 1999; Nower, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2004; Strickland, Lewicki, & 
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Katz, 1966). Explanations for this co-occurrence include impulsiveness of the individual (Potenza, 2008; 
Romer et al., 2009), perceived self-efficacy (Krueger & Dickson, 1994), and optimistic risk perception. 
Optimistic risk perception results from event outcome probability bias (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; 
Krueger & Dickson, 1994) characterized by higher regard for positive outcome probabilities compared to 
negative ones. In computational simulation studies (Broekens & Baarslag, 2014) we showed that 
intensity of sensations, risk-taking, pathological gambling, and lower levels of fear co-occur when 
optimistic risk perception underlies the temporal difference (TD) signal used in learning to adapt to a 
risky task. We found that optimistic calculation of the TD signal, compared to different forms of realistic 
calculation, results in risk taking and in persistent gambling behavior. We also found that an optimistic 
TD signal results in less fear and more intense joy. We found these results to be consistent for a variety 
of risky tasks. This computationally replicates the finding that effects of perception of control on risk-
taking are mediated by optimistic risk perceptions (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and replicates the 
positive correlation between sensation intensity and pathological gambling (Powell, Hardoon, 
Derevensky, & Gupta, 1999). In that work we argue that the simulations underline the importance of the 
relation between the prefrontal cortex (as a locus of control and outcome value representation) 
(Kennerley, Behrens, & Wallis, 2011; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008; Romer et al., 2009; Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008), the amygdala (as a locus of gated value recalculation and fear processing) (Bechara et 
al., 2000; Murray, 2007; Seymour & Dolan, 2008) and gives further evidence for Reinforcement Learning 
being a computational model for reward processing, emotion and task-adaptive behavior (Berridge et 
al., 2009; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Murray, 2007; O’Doherty, 2004; Redish et al., 2007; Rolls, 2000; Rolls 
& Grabenhorst, 2008; Schultz et al., 1997; Suri, 2002).  
The evolutionary “purpose” of emotion and the TD error is similar 
From an evolutionary perspective emotions serve behavioral adaptation of the individual. Emotions aid 
in action selection by promoting activity (Frijda, 2004), emotions aid in assessment of the situation 
(Damasio, 1994; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), emotions are internal feedback signals changing future 
behavior (Baumeister et al., 2007). And finally, emotions are important social signals (Paul Ekman & 
Friesen, 2003). Given such strong involvement of emotions in action, many emotions are probably not 
tied to humans alone but widespread in nature. To fully understand the phenomenon of emotion it 
needs to be investigated cross species (Bekoff, 2008; J. Panksepp, 1982; Jaap Panksepp, 1998) .  
What is the purpose of emotion for the individual animal? Building on this cross-species view, I propose 
that emotions are short-term mechanisms to aid an agent’s long term survival and as a byproduct 
optimize long term well-being of the agent. This view of emotion is not new or unique to the TDRL 
proposal. For example, Cabanac (Cabanac, 1992) already proposed that one of the first mental events to 
have emerged in nature is the ability to experience pleasure and displeasure in order to optimize 
survival. Here, however, it is important to understand TDRL and emotion in relation to survival of an 
agent. The feeling of overall happiness (well-being) is relatively stable against important life events in 
humans (Brickman et al., 1978; Veenhoven, 1991). However, when important social or biological needs 
are repeatedly not met, overall well-being is definitely impacted, as is the case in human poverty, but 
also stimuli- and socially deprived animals. More food, friends, money or power do not make an 
individual necessarily happier in the long run, but a severe lack of such means does negatively impact 
well-being. This points to the view that there is a threshold that defines “good enough”. Emotions aid 
the individual in making those decisions that work towards this threshold. They help us to decide what 
to do next, relative to how we are currently doing. If you have a lot of friends, but no food, then perhaps 
it is a good idea to focus on getting some food. Evolutionary speaking, complex organisms need to have 
a motivational heuristic for a potential next action, relative to how the whole organism is doing as well 
as relative to alternative actions. This is in line with causal factor space in which it is proposed that the 
motivational force for behavioral alternatives is assessed relatively (McFarland & Sibly, 1975). This view 
is directly advocated by Damasio, who proposes somatic markers as a construct for this heuristic 
(Damasio, 1994), and resonates perfectly with TDRL as explained next.  
The computational view of TDRL aims at optimizing utility expressed as the cumulative discounted 
future reward. Optimization in nature can be relaxed to satisficing, trying to achieve a level that is good 
enough for survival, which mirrors the “good enough threshold” of well-being. If reward and utility are 
grounded in multimodal homeostasis related to pain, food, etc., as proposed earlier and compatible 
drive-based rewards in RL literature, then TDRL perfectly models well-being, at least to a level that is 
good enough to survive comfortably. As utility is directly represented in the values of actions, changes in 
utility due to actions generate TD errors and should therefore also generate emotions. The purpose of 
TD errors and emotions are therefore the same: to signal significant changes in the well-being of the 
agent.   
Finally, in many species emotions also have a social function. Emotions are expressed and recognized 
(Bekoff, 2008; Kret, Jaasma, Bionda, & Wijnen, 2016). Functionally, emotional expressions are social 
signals aimed at regulating (or perhaps influencing is a better term here) the behavior of others. For 
such a social signaling mechanism to be beneficial to the individual and species, there must be 
agreement on what such signals mean. This shared understanding can only evolve if there is 
evolutionary pressure on reproduction. For the expression and recognition of many emotions this 
evolutionary pressure is straightforward and argued already by many others19 (Bekoff, 2008; P. Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971; Jaap Panksepp, 1998). The TDRL theory of emotion explains that the driving force for this 
social signal is the sender’s individual TD error. I give three simple examples of how an individual TDRL 
signal can trigger the generation of a social signal. First, rather than physically punishing another 
individual for actions that harmed you, your expression of anger helps avoiding physical harm to you 
and the person you are angry at and serves the same purpose: the expression of anger is a social signal 
aimed at communicating a negative TD. Second, rather than feeling miserable and die, the expression of 
sadness will help an infant to get appropriate attention from her parents: the expression of sadness is a 
social signal aimed at communicating the need for help. Third, the expression and recognition of guilt 
assures that the angry other knows you incorporated their scorn in your future behavioral tendencies. 
This avoids the built up of aggression and retribution: the expression of guilt is a social signal aimed at 
communicating the incorporation of a (socially) communicated negative TD. I could go on, but in all of 
these cases, the emotional expressions have to do with the signaling of experienced TD’s (anger, 
sadness, guilt) and the confirmation that the signal has been correctly received (guilt, worry, 
forgiveness). The more complex the signal the less likely a particular expressive pattern for that TD error 
evolved. This explains why joy, sadness and anger are among the best recognizable emotions, even cross 
species. They are related to immediate TD effects and expression is close to the typical behaviors 
accompanying such mental states (play and laughter, immobility and crying, fighting and shouting).  
They are extremely important for conflict resolution and child raising. The TDRL theory of emotion is 
                                                          
19 Although the number of facially expressed emotions that are cross culturally recognized by humans is a currently 
debated topic, there is no doubt that the multimodal expression and recognition of some emotions, such as joy 
and sadness, is universal even across different species of mammals (Bekoff, 2008). 
therefore compatible with the view that emotions are social phenomenon, and proposes that emotions 
are widespread in animals that raise children or have the need to resolve social conflict.   
Discussion of limitations and ramification of the approach 
We showed that the TDRL Theory of Emotion is compatible with established cognitive explanations of 
emotion such as appraisal theory. In addition to these cognitive views, the TDRL Theory of Emotion is 
also able to explain how emotions relate to both task learning and cognitive processing as well as 
grounds the emotion in adaptive behavior. It also provides a clear and simple explanation for why all 
emotions have associated positive or negative valence, and are related to action tendencies. It also 
proposes why emotions are different from but correlated with hedonic pleasure (liking: the multimodal 
reward signal). Finally, it explains the emergence of more complex emotions as a result of an agent’s 
cognitive capabilities such as anticipation, internal simulation of interaction, and agency detection.  
It is important to also determine the boundaries of the TDRL theory of Emotion. The theory does not 
provide a clear explanation for affective reactions resulting from music and humor. Although it is 
tempting to propose that musical harmony, like play, is an inherently positive stimulus forming the basis 
for positive reactions to music, I do not go this far. Similarly one could propose that humor has to do 
with the unexpected positive outcome of a verbal puzzle. However, I believe affective phenomena 
involved in humor and music are at this point out of bounds for this theory. 
The TDRL Theory of Emotion in its current form does not address mood. Mood is the longer term 
undifferentiated, less intense form of affect (Beedie et al., 2005). It has been shown that mood primes 
mood congruent memories (Bower, 1981) and attention towards congruent stimuli (MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986). However, the relation between mood and emotion is far from clear. For example, 
depression is associated with reduced emotional reactivity to sad contexts (Rottenberg, 2005). A 
possible interpretation of mood in terms of TDRL is that mood is the current feeling of well-being (the 
value or utility of the organism) while emotions are the TD errors. This would explain the previous 
finding: if the current situation is already quite negative, then additional negativity will not trigger high 
TD errors because neurobiologically it is impossible to end up much worse, therefore the emotional 
reaction is also reduced. However, this interpretation needs further investigation.  
Social emotions such as anger and guilt have been explained as feedback signals above, but such 
emotions do need more than standard model-free or model-based RL. To explain these, an agent needs 
the capacity to attribute agency to the actions of another agent. The typical RL framework does not 
address this. If RL is used in a multi-agent setting, in which signals and behavior can be detected to be 
originating from other agents, then this is a start to better explain social emotions. This is important 
future work. 
I proposed the labels joy, distress, hope and fear for the positive, negative and anticipated positive and 
negative TD error respectively. Also I proposed that disappointment and relief refer to the correction to 
the anticipated TD signal, with relief being a positive correction for an anticipated negative TD and 
disappointment a negative correction to an anticipated positive TD. Other labels could be proposed 
(such as anger and guilt, as mentioned earlier) but the question remains why one would label these RL-
related signals as such. Answering this question involves the following steps, First, one should analyze 
theoretical consistency. For example, model-free RL does not contain a model that can be used for 
anticipation, and hop and fear need anticipation, therefore emotions resulting from anticipation must 
assume some model capable of doing forward simulation. So, labels for anticipation emotions that do 
not involve a form of look ahead in the RL model would not pass this test. Second, one should replicate 
generic principles of emotions during learning tasks in computo such as fear extinction and joy 
habituation. Third, one should replicate data on emotional intensities found during experiments. In this 
and previous articles  (Broekens et al., 2015; T. Moerland et al., 2016). we have shown theoretical 
consistency and in computo replication of overall principles. Data replication studies are important 
future work. 
Human adults are noisy subjects to study emotion. To study the basis of emotion and affect, human 
adults are not suitable for the following reasons. First, adults have high level of control over the sensory 
influence on the content of their working memory. Human adults are able to internally simulate fictional 
interaction with their environment (thought as internal simulation of behavior (Cotterill, 2001; Hesslow, 
2002)) as well as have a hard time to stop anticipating (stay in the now). This enables them to imagine 
uncontrollably during an experiment influencing any learning or emotion task generating new emotions 
as well as up or downregulating emotional intensity. Second, human adults have developed strong 
coping and reflection capabilities (emotion down regulation). As a result, emotions will not be expressed 
or even felt with the same intensity they are generated in young children or animals. Third, affective 
associations have been built up for decades (attitudes producing emotions due to association). As a 
result, no emotion is the result of the appraisal of a stimulus or though alone but also of a large set of 
associated attitudes that are personal and uncontrollable in an experiment. Fourth, adults of any species 
have formed a rich set of habits, and habits will downregulate emotions (e.g. through extinction and joy 
habituation). As a result, the signal you try to measure is weak at the basis already, especially in 
controlled experiments as this is such a common setting in general for many people (office, desk, 
pushing computer buttons, etc…). Fifth, language plays an important role in the labeling of felt 
emotions, and this labeling process probably strongly influence how adults think about emotions as well 
as classify emotions. As such there is probably important interplay between emotion regulation, coping 
and language use. These reasons lead me to conclude that to study the basis of emotion, the human 
adult condition is unsuitable and it is arguably an unusual condition from an evolutionary point of view. 
This highlights how difficult it is to study the fundamentals of emotion in human adults. Perspective 
taking, coping, reference points as well as elaborate use of language are cognitively highly advanced 
capabilities that are hardly representative of the fundamentals of emotional processing in nature. 
Concludingly, it is essential that future research focusses on psychometric instruments that are capable 
of assessing the experienced emotional intensity in animals and children in a reliable and valid way. 
Relevance to the advancement of human robot/agent interaction. 
The diversity of tasks and settings in which robots and virtual agents need to operate prohibits 
preprogramming all possible behaviors in advance. Such agents need to learn from interaction with 
humans (W. Bradley Knox, Stone, & Breazeal, 2013; Thomaz & Breazeal, 2006). Machine learning needs 
a human in the loop. Humans use emotions as a natural way to communicate and emotional 
communication is essential in the learning process of infants (Buss & Kiel, 2004; Chong et al., 2003; 
Klinnert, 1984; Trevarthen, 1984). Typically the aim in this field of developmental robotics is that robots 
develop task-related skills in similar ways as children do: by trial and error, and by expressing emotions 
for help and confirmation, and learning from emotions expressed by others for shaping their behavior.  
Reinforcement Learning (RL)  (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Tesauro, 1995)  is a well-established computational 
technique enabling robots and agents to learn skills by trial and error, for example learning to walk 
(Kober et al., 2013). Also, RL can deal with large state spaces when coupled to pattern detection using 
deep-learning (Mnih et al., 2013).  
At this point there is no generally accepted computational framework that links emotions to 
reinforcement learning (see (T. M. Moerland, Broekens, & Jonker, 2018) for a review). This means that 
currently robots and virtual characters that learn based on RL lack the ability to produce and interpret 
emotions in line with their learning process. There are frameworks based on cognitive appraisal theory 
(Joao Dias, Mascarenhas, & Paiva, 2011; S. Marsella, Gratch, & Petta, 2010; S. C. Marsella & Gratch, 
2009), but these models assume that emotions arise from a cognitive reasoning process, not a learning 
process based on exploration and positive and negative feedback. There is also research showing that 
robots and agents can use human feedback as signals to influence their learning process based on 
reinforcement learning (Broekens, 2007; W. Bradley Knox, Glass, Love, Maddox, & Stone, 2012; W.B. 
Knox & Stone, 2010; W. Bradley Knox et al., 2013; Thomaz & Breazeal, 2006; Thrun et al., 1999),  and 
this provides a good starting from a human in the loop learning perspective.  
A computational model of emotions based on the TDRL Theory of emotion will enhance interactive 
learning abilities of robots and virtual agents. It will make the learning process more explainable and 
transparent for the users of that robot. Emotions that are simulated and expressed by the robot are 
grounded in the learning process of the robot. Emotional expressions of the human user can be properly 
interpreted by the robot in terms of learning-related signals.  (fig 1). 
Concludingly, the development of a TDRL Theory of emotion is instrumental for the embedding of smart 
social robots and virtual agents in our society. 
 
Figure 1. A robot learns a task using RL as its controller. The computational model of emotion selects an appropriate emotion to express based 
on the current state of the learning process. The robot expresses the emotion. The robot owner interprets the signal and situation, and reacts 
emotionally to the robot. The robot detects and filters the reaction for relevance to the task (e.g., the owner’s frown could also be due to reading 
a difficult email). The computational model of emotion interprets the owner’s emotional reaction as learning-related feedback.  
Emotions and animal welfare 
There is abundant evidence showing that other animals are emotional beings too (Bekoff, 2008). Recent 
evidence includes bonobos showing attentional bias towards pictures of emotional bonobos as 
compared to neutral bonobo pictures (Kret et al., 2016), social-relation driven reciprocity of agnostic 
support (a bystander helping one individual in conflict because you like him/her) in ravens (Fraser & 
Bugnyar, 2012), and separation anxiety in dogs and cats (Schwartz, 2003). To quote Bekoff (Bekoff, 
2008), “it is bad biology to propose that animals do not have emotions”, for very straightforward 
reasons: animal brains are structured like ours, their behavior looks like ours, they respond the same to 
many of our drugs, and their evolutionary roots are the same as ours. Why would they completely lack 
emotionality if it so important for humans?  
However, for some species, most biologists would agree that they do not possess an internal mental life 
and therefore probably no emotions either. For example, flies, spiders, and zebrafish, would probably 
not feel or care about anything in our sense of the words caring and feeling, while bonobos, rats, dogs 
and raven do. So it seems that at some point it makes no sense to talk about emotions.   
I propose that the TDRL theory of emotion draws a useful “line”. I propose that naturally evolved species 
capable of incorporating delayed motivational effects of actions in their future action selection process 
must also possess some rudimentary form of emotion. The reasoning for this is that to be able to 
incorporate such delayed motivational effects (reward and punishment) they need to be able to assess 
the temporal difference signal associated with the effect. This signal is the animal’s assessment of 
change in well-being and hence is a sufficient condition for a rudimentary form of joy versus distress.  
This breaks up the world of living beings into those that show temporal difference learning and those 
that do not. It provides a clear cut, and easily studied criterion: whenever a species shows adaptive 
behavior that can only be explained with TD error processing, it must be considered as a candidate for 
emotions as well. As already argued above, quite a lot of species would already fall within the set of 
emotional beings. All animals that show parenting, play and social conflict resolution, telltale signs of 
reflex shaping through (social) TD error processing, must be considered emotional in the proper human 
sense.  
Conclusion 
I proposed that all emotions are manifestations of Temporal Difference (TD) error assessment. I 
discussed computational, psychological and neurobiological evidence. I explained how the TDRL Theory 
of Emotion explains the links between emotion, action, motivation and appraisal. I discussed the 
ramifications of this proposal for emotions as social signals, emotions in animals, and the relation 
between emotion, cognition and task learning. I conclude that the TDRL Theory of emotion can explain a 
wide variety of emotion-related phenomena in a unified way, and proposes many lines of future 
research. 
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